Global Crisis and Corporate Governance
Abstract
This paper analyses the problems and new challenges for corporate governance in the context of global fi nancial crisis 2008–2009. Factors explaining the increased ineffi ciency of large global companies are considered. Similarity between modern global corporation with its dispersed ownership structure and soviet-type enterprise in “nationwide ownership” is stressed — because the lack of responsible owner with long-term strategic horizon in both cases. The necessity of search for new organizational models of big businesses is argued. Finally, the description of strengths and weaknesses of Russian companies in the fi eld of corporate governance is provided.
Keywords:
corporate governance, financial crisis, global corporation, soviet-type enterprise, distorted incentives of managers and shareholders
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Published
2010-06-16
How to Cite
Yakovlev, A. A., Danilov, Y. A., & Simachev, Y. V. (2010). Global Crisis and Corporate Governance. Russian Management Journal, 8(2), 21–34. Retrieved from https://rjm.spbu.ru/article/view/360
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New Research
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Articles of the Russian Management Journal are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.
