The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring and the Decision to Go Public
Abstract
This article is a translation from Quarterly Journal of Economics 113 (1): 187–225.
Downloads
Download data is not yet available.
Published
2009-03-23
How to Cite
Pagano, M., & Roell, A. (2009). The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring and the Decision to Go Public. Russian Management Journal, 7(1), 79–108. Retrieved from https://rjm.spbu.ru/article/view/445
Issue
Section
Modern Classics: Corporate Governance — IPO’s Logic
License
Articles of the Russian Management Journal are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.