Ownership Concentration and Corporate Governance: Evolution of Ideas
Abstract
The paper paints a general picture of the contemporary corporate landscape of the world economy in terms of ownership concentration. Two basic types of large corporations prevailed in different countries are discerned — a widelyheld corporation (a model W) and a corporation with large blockholders (a model B). Advantages and disadvantages of these alternative models of corporate governance are examined and various economic, legal and political determinants that shape choice between them are analyzed. In the concluding section various scenarios of further evolution of the specific Russian model of corporate governance evolved in turbulent 1990’s are discussed.
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Published
2006-03-20
How to Cite
Kapelushnikov, R. I. (2006). Ownership Concentration and Corporate Governance: Evolution of Ideas. Russian Management Journal, 4(1), 3–28. Retrieved from https://rjm.spbu.ru/article/view/582
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New Research
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Articles of the Russian Management Journal are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.
