Репутация, квалификация и мотивация как драйверы ценности

Michael A. Limitovskiy

Authors

Michael A. Limitovskiy Graduate School of Financial Management, Academy of National Economy under the Government of Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia

Abstract

The article is devoted to the insider’s qualification, reputation and motivation as the shareholders’ value drivers. Using my personal experience and the theoretical analysis I came to the conclusion that any insider’s activity can be treated as value creative or value destroying in dependence of the market’s attitude to the insider’s personality, estimation of his qualification and motivation. This effect was called «the signaling inversion”. In accordance to this point I worked out a simple model which shows that insider’s activity can be counted as value enhancing if in prevailing opinions more than 2/3 of his investment and financial decisions are maid in shareholders’ best interests. In addition to it, the model proves the impossibility of the insider’s value-based motivation in the absence of the responsibility for the wrong decisions, particularly for the acceptance of value destroying projects. In conclusion there were presented some indirect evidences of the signaling inversion effect.

Keywords:

insiders, outsiders, agency problem, equity value, motivation, qualification, reputation, overinvestment, cross-subsidizing, investment and financial decisions, signaling effects, signaling inversion

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References

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