Анализ кооперативных соглашений на мировом рынке нефти

Maria A. Nastych

doi:10.21638/spbu18.2018.303

Authors

Maria A. Nastych St. Petersburg University, Russia https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1219-129X

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu18.2018.303

Abstract

The article examines the issue of the advantage and key conditions of collusion between the major oil exporting countries on the world oil market. This issue is explored in the paper within the framework of the concepts of stochastic cooperative game theory and the theory of industrial organisation. Namely, the concepts of game theory correspond to the conflicting interests of collusion participants. Next, the possibility of collusion between market players is considered and resolved using the theory of cooperative games. Stochastic methods of constructing and investigating the characteristic function of a cooperative game help to take into account the high volatility of the oil market. Further, the Cournot model of the theory of industrial organisation describes the strategic management of production volumes to maximize profits. The Stackelberg model takes into account the incentives to collude through the emergence of an industry leader, who first announces his management strategies. Based on these methodologies, the paper concludes that the collusion for its participants is beneficial, and the equilibrium levels of quotas for oil extraction are found.

Keywords:

world oil market, OPEC, collusion, stochastic cooperative game, Cα-core, VaR

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