Impact of Investments Monitoring by a Large Stockholder on Corporate Governance
Abstract
The article discusses the one of the fundamental aspects of agency problem, i. e. information asymmetry and managers’ opportunities to gain private benefits to the prejudice of stockholders.
The presence of a large outside stockholder may result both in strengthening of control over managers and collusion between them. A behavioral model describing this situation is presented.
The model qualitatively supports the results of empirical studies about prevalence of collusion effect in Russian economy.
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References
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Published
2004-06-30
How to Cite
Dorofeev, E. A. (2004). Impact of Investments Monitoring by a Large Stockholder on Corporate Governance. Russian Management Journal, 2(2), 057–072. Retrieved from https://rjm.spbu.ru/article/view/833
Issue
Section
New Research
License
Articles of the Russian Management Journal are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.
