Firm Performance and Managerial Turnover: The Case of Ukraine
Abstract
The paper investigates whether and how turnover of senior managers in Ukrainian firms is related to firm performance. Using a novel dataset of Ukrainian joint stock companies covering the years 2002 to 2006, the authors find statistically significant negative association between the likelihood of managerial turnover and the past performance of firms measured by return on assets and return on sales. Our analysis suggests that the strength of the turnover-performance relationship does not depend on factors such as managerial ownership and supervisory board size. However, we do find significant entrenchments effects associated with ownership by managers. Overall, our analysis suggests that by the early 2000s, Ukraine has established basic corporate governance mechanisms that facilitate improvements in firm performance.
Keywords:
corporate governance, managerial labor market, transition, Ukraine
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Published
2009-12-14
How to Cite
Muravyev, A. A., Talavera, A. V., Bilyk, O. A., & Grechaniuk, B. V. (2009). Firm Performance and Managerial Turnover: The Case of Ukraine. Russian Management Journal, 7(4), 13–32. Retrieved from https://rjm.spbu.ru/article/view/386
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New Research
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Articles of the Russian Management Journal are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.
