Structure vs. Function and the Evolution of Corporate Governance Regulation and Research in the United States

Authors

  • James M. Gillies Schulich School of Business, York University, Canada
  • Peter Bartha Schulich School of Business, York University, Canada
  • Richard Leblanc York University, Canada

Abstract

Five significant events played a dominant role in establishing the current form and practices of corporate governance in the United States — the adoption of British common law, the decision of Chief Justice Marshall in the Dartmouth College Case, the work of Berle and Means, the rise of institutional investors and the unfriendly takeover movement in the 1980’s, and the serious breakdown in corporate governance in the late 1990’s and early years of the twentyfirst century. Academic research in the field of corporate governance was relevant in shaping the impact of only one of these five factors that influenced the manner that corporations were governed over the past two hundred years. It is suggested that a sixth significant event may be one the verge of causing major change to corporate governance practices in the United States and that it is being driven almost entirely by academic research.

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Published

2006-03-20

How to Cite

Gillies, J. M., Bartha, P., & Leblanc, R. (2006). Structure vs. Function and the Evolution of Corporate Governance Regulation and Research in the United States. Russian Management Journal, 4(1), 147–162. Retrieved from https://rjm.spbu.ru/article/view/608

Issue

Section

Practice of Management