Доминирование как результат сочетания интересов: бизнес-стратегии в ритейле и цепях поставок

Anton N. Oleynik

Authors

Anton N. Oleynik Memorial University of Newfoundland, Canada; Institute of Economics, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia

Abstract

The neoclassical approach toward explaining domination in the market is confronted by the approach of critical theory, namely the critical sociology of Foucault and Bourdieu. Special attention is paid to techniques of domination by virtue of a constellation of interests in the market and its applications to business strategies. Techniques of domination are modeled on a field of domination composed of a triad, one of the organizational actors performing the function of drawing boundaries and controlling access, as an example. The concept of territoriality as spatially embedded power is applied to organization studies. Three types of boundaries are compared: institutional, spatial and financial. Only one actor in the field has the ability to maximize its satisfaction, while the two others minimize missed opportunities. The proposed approach is applied to the situation in the retail trade and supply chains.

Keywords:

domination, alignment, maximization of satisfaction, minimization of missed opportunities, entry control, retail trade

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References

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